Abstract-Remote systems authentication schemes need more research and investigation due to increasing of hackers and attacks with the population of wired and wireless traffic. All of the popular remote user and system authentication schemes are fixed authentication and provides only entity authentication, not provides any data authentication. Recently Das proposed a flexible remote systems authentication scheme using smart card [8] that checks authenticity of user as well as remote system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Remote user authentication in sending information is a great research challenge. Remote user authentication is made of two types -Entity Authentication and Data Authentication. In Entity Authentication remote system checks the authenticity of remote user by the entity (e.g. password, smart card etc) of user before the transmission of user message. Authenticity is verified by the theory of public key cryptography. But Data Authentication remote system checks the authenticity of remote user by user message after receiving the message. Many different Data Authentication [1] [2] [3] and Entity Authentication [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] are studied separately in literature.
Remote password authentication scheme using smart card was first proposed by Chang and Wu in 1993 [5] . After that, several new remote user password authentication schemes with smart card have been proposed. Remote user authentication using smart card, introduced by Hwang and Li in 2005 [6] , is an application of ElGamal"s cryptosystem [7] . After that, few public-key based authentication techniques have been invented and improved. But all of the techniques check only the authenticity of user but can not check the authenticity of system. In 2006, Das et al [8] developed a flexible remote user authentication scheme using smart card that authenticates user as well as remote system.
The entire remote user authentication schemes are fixed authentication (no time variant authentication) and provide only Entity authentication, not providing any Data authentication. This motivates us to develop a scheme that will serve as data authentication as well as entity authentication. The Automatic Variable Password (AVP) technique [9] can be applied by changing the password from session to session to make the password unbreakable. In this paper, we proposed Modified Das"s scheme which is application of AVP technique that will check the authenticity of user time to time throughout the accessing of the remote server and it serves as a data authentication as well as entity authentication. We also show that Das"s scheme is vulnerable to different attacks and how brilliantly Modified Das"s scheme defenses those attacks and enhances the efficiency of the scheme.
II. REVIEW OF DAS"S REMOTE SYSTEM AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
Das"s Remote System Authentication is a mutual authentication scheme, which authenticates the remote user as well as the remote system. The user chooses a password (PW i ). The user has no private or public key but the remote system has a primary secret key (x) and a secret number (y). This scheme consists of three phases: registration phase, authentication phase and password change phase.
In the registration phase, the user U i submits PW i to the remote system (RS) for registration. The RS computes N i = h (PW i, ID i ) h(x) and personalize a smart card with the parameters h(.), N i, h(PW i ,ID i ) and y.
The authentication phase is divided into two parts, namely h(x) y Tu). If C i *=C i, the user is authentic.
In RS authentication phase, RS computes X i = h(h (PW i, ID i ) h(x) Tu Ts*) where Ts* is timestamp of RS"s system and sends (X i, Ts*) to the user. Let the user receives the response at time Tu*. If the time interval between Tu* and Ts* is a valid time interval then computes X i *= h(Ni Tu Ts*). If X i * =X i, then the RS is authentic.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF DAS"S SCHEME
We present a cryptanalysis of Das"s remote system authentication scheme in this section. Das showed that, although his scheme is secured from replay, stolen verifier, impersonation, guessing and denial-of-service attack but his scheme is still vulnerable to modification attack, reverse XOR attack and adversary system attack. We demonstrate these attacks.
（i） Modification attack: As the remote system checks the authenticity of user before the transmission of message. Remote system does not verify the authentication of user by user message after receiving the message. So an adversary can change user message in the transmission of user message. Hence Das"s scheme is suffer from modification attack. （ii） Reverse XOR attack: During the registration phase, the secret key x has to be applied. Now based on the reversible property of XOR operation, if the primary secret key of remote system (x) is hacked and user password (PW i ) is guessed, then nonce, N i can be easily obtained. Hence Das"s scheme is vulnerable to the reverse XOR attack. （iii） Adversary system attack: Suppose the processors in remote system and card reader are very hasty and the transmission of data between user and server is happening in very speedily. In this type of communication, the timestamp of user Tu in user authentication phase and the timestamp of server Ts* in remote system authentication phase will be equal. During remote system authentication phase, remote system sends X i [ = h(N i Tu Ts*) or h (h (PW i, ID i ) h(x) Tu Ts*)] to the user over a public channel. As Tu and Ts*are same so X i = h (N i ). Again suppose an adversary has stolen the user smart card for one time and just extract the N i and mode of hash function is known to him so he can easily compute X i which is h(x). Now if the adversary is also a user and accessing another server then he can send X i to the user by that illicit sever over the public channel before the original server sent. Then user can easily certify that server as an authentic server and communicates with that illicit server. The adversary, thus, can trick the user by connecting him with a wrong server. Das"s scheme is therefore insecure from the adversary system attack.
IV. MODIFIED DAS"S REMOTE SYSTEM AUTHENTICATION SCHEME Modified Das"s Remote System Authentication Scheme is mainly divided into two parts, namely, Entity Authentication Phase and Data Authentication Phase. The Entity Authentication Phase checks the authenticity of the
A. Entity Authentication Phase

1) User Enrollment Phase
This phase is invoked whenever a user U R wants to register to the remote system S R . The U R chooses a password PW 1 and identifier ID and submits it to the S R . After receiving enrollment request, the S R performs the following operations. DUE1: Computes, N = h (PW 1 ID x), where x is a primary secret key of S R , h(.) is a one-way hash function and is a bitwise concatenation operator.
DUE2: Personalizes a smart card C S with the parameters h(.), N, PW 1 , ID, E, D and y, where y is the secondary secret number stored in each registered user"s smart card, E is the encryption key and D is the decryption key generated by remote system by applying RSA algorithm.
DUE3: Sends the C S to the U R in a secure channel. User Login Phase When the U R wants to login to the S R then the following steps are executed. This part is executed only once when the U R wants to login to the S R . U R inserts his C S and keys his identity ID and password PW 1 '. The C S verifies the entered ID and PW 1 Then send (D, C, Tu) as login request to the S R . Upon receiving the login request at time Ts, the S R authenticates the U R the following steps, DUL3: Computes, h(PW 1 ID x) = D h(y Tu) DUL4: Computes, C* = h (h (PW 1 ID x) y Tu) If C = C*, the S R accepts the login request and gives permission to the U R to send the data.
2) User Accessing Phase
User accessing phase is executed to check authenticity of U R when U R is accessing the S R . This phase is executed at a 3 regular interval during the time of accessing the S R by U R .
Let T P is timestamp of S R when the U R starts to access the S R and at a ∆T regular interval the S R wants to verify the authenticity of U R . Now let T P + ( ∆T +………………………) = T P '
Assume the U R "s message M which is sent to the S R , is a continuous bit stream. C S divides the M into different blocks of fixed size as the length of PW 1 in Date sending phase of Data authentication phase. Let the message blocks are M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ,………., M n .
The C S generates modified blocks by the following way, PW 2 = PW 1 M 1 , PW 3 = PW 2 M 2 , So, PW n = PW n-1 M n-1 Thus the password at i th position will be,
The C S sends PW i blocks simultaneously as message blocks to S R. The C S also uses PW i blocks one by one for every authentication checking execution after every ∆T regular interval. DUA1: The S R sends < T P '> as an authentication query to the C S through a public channel after every ∆T regular interval. DUA2: After receiving the authentication query, the C S asks the U R to enter the ID and PW 1 . DUA3: Then the U R enters his ID' and PW' 1 . DUA4: The C S validates the entered ID' and PW' 1 with the stored ones in C S . If the ID and PW 1 are correct then executes the following steps, otherwise terminates the accessing, DUA4.1: Computes, D' = h (PW i ID x) h (y T P ') DUA4.2: Computes, C' = h (N y T P ') DUA4.3: Send (D', C', T P ') as authentication request to the S R through a public channel. DUA5: After receiving the authentication request, the S R authenticates the U R the following steps, DUA5.1: Computes, h (PW i ID x) = D' h (y T P ') DUA5.2: Computes, C' * = h (h (PW i ID x) y T P ') DUA5.3: Checks whether C' = C'*. If it holds, then gives permission to access again otherwise terminates the accessing. 3) Remote System Authentication Phase Remote system authentication phase is executed to check the authenticity of S R . The correctness of the S R is checked in this phase and executed when authenticity of U R is passed correctly. DRA1: Computes, X= h ((h (PW 1 ID x) h(Tu)) h(Ts*) where Ts* is the timestamp of S R. DRA2: Send (X, Ts*) to the U R over a public channel. The smart card computes X* = h ((N h (Tu)) h(Ts*) and checks whether X=X* or not. If X =X*, then S R is authentic and U R starts accessing the resources.
B. Data Authentication Phase
1) Key Generation Phase
Key Generation Phase is executed after receiving the enrollment request of U R by S R in parallel with user enrollment phase of Entity authentication phase. This phase is executed only once for one U R . In this phase the S R performs the following steps, DKG1: Generates Encryption Key (E) and Decryption Key (D) by RSA algorithm. DKG2: Stores E and D into C S with other parameters h(.), N, PW 1 , ID and y.
2) Data Sending Phase
Data sending phase is executed after the User login phase of Entity authentication phase. In this phase the C S performs the following steps, DDS1: Divides the M into different message blocks of fixed size as the length PW 1 . Let the message blocks are M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ,………., M n . DDS2: Sends the Decryption key D to the S R through a public channel . DDS3: Sends first message block M 1 and the Digital Signature of M 1 (Calculated the Hash of M 1 then encrypts it by E) to the S R. DDS4: Generates PW 2, PW 3 ,……….,PW n blocks by the above theory. DDS5: Sends PW 2, PW 3 ,……….,PW n blocks and Digital Signature of them to the S R through a public channel without waiting for authentication query from S R . When S R sends authentication query after a ∆T regular interval then stops the sending of PW i . After authentication checking if S R gives permission to access then sends PW i blocks again simultaneously. DDS6: If receives any request for sending any block again from S R , then immediately sends it. V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF MODIFIED DAS"S SCHEME We analysis that how Modified Das"s scheme is protected from the various security parameters. We discuss the defense of the scheme from the various attacks by which previous techniques are suffered.
Modification attack: In Modified Das"s scheme the remote system checks the authenticity of user on user message after the transmission of message. If an adversary alters the authentic user message during the transmission of message, the remote system can easily identify it. Hence Modified Das"s scheme is not suffer from Modification attack. Reverse XOR attack: In this authentication scheme, N [= h(PW ID (x)] is computed in the registration phase. If PW is guessed and mode of hash function is leaked by an adversary, he never gets N because N is a function of four parameters PW, ID and x. Hence Modified Das"s scheme is undoubtedly not vulnerable to the reverse XOR attack. Adversary system attack: In remote system authentication phase, remote system sends X [=((h (PW ID x) h (Tu)) h(Ts)] to the user over a public channel. For a very first system where Tu and Ts are same X will not be equal to the h (N). So if an adversary extracts the N by stoling the user smart card for one time and mode of hash function is known to him then he never gets X. So the user always authenticates a correct server. Hence Modified Das"s scheme is firmly secured from the adversary system attack.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Suppose U R submits the following password and identifier to the S R , User Password (PW 1 ): User"sAuthentication User Identifier (ID): IdentityofRemoteUser Suppose S R generates Encryption and Decryption key by RSA algorithm in the following way, Let, two large prime numbers P=13 and Q=19. So, N=13×19=247 Encryption Key (E) = 31 and Decryption Key (D) = 7 Suppose U R sends a message of 1600 bits to the S R , User Message (M): "Authentication in sending information is a research challenge. Time Variant Authentication technique will check the authenticity of user for time to time throughout the accessing of the remote server." M =
A. Results of Entity Authentication
The C S generates the following new passwords after receiving every authentication query from S R , PW 2 
